Resolving regional conflicts and public opinion: The Nigerian experience in Liberian crisis by Salami, B.O.
                                      
 
 Special Issue: Development and Sustainability in Africa – Part 2 
International Journal of Development and Sustainability  
Online ISSN: 2168-8662 – www.isdsnet.com/ijds 
Volume 2 Number 2 (2013): Pages 777-786 
ISDS Article ID: IJDS13032301 
Resolving regional conflicts and public 
opinion: The Nigerian experience in 
Liberian crisis 
B. Olawale Salami * 
Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, Olabisi Onabanjo University, Ago-Iwoye, Ogun State, Nigeria 
 
 
Abstract   
Nigeria played an important role which led to the resolution of the Liberian crisis between 1990 and 1997. But 
between 1990 and 1993 towards the end of General Ibrahim Babangida’s regime (1985-1993), Nigeria’s role in the 
Liberian peace process became a major issue which preoccupied Nigeria’s external relations within the West African 
Sub-region. This paper examines in how public opinion influences government attitude and posture towards the 
Liberian situation.  
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1. Introduction 
Conflict spots dot various parts of the globe we live in basically due to cohabitation among peoples of diverse 
social, political and ethnic background. In other words, conflicts arising from interactions amongst peoples 
may be traced to racial, religious, ethnic and political differences. Over the years, such conflicts either local or 
cross-border had been prosecuted with vehement hatred and sustained with most sophisticated weaponry, 
resulting in colossal human wastage, horrendous destruction of property as well as displacement of persons. 
The world is littered with states carrying the burden of artificial boundaries. Indeed, only a few states like 
Australia, New Zealand and some other Island states, are immune from the traditional problems of artificial 
boundaries (Akinyemi, 2001: 3-4; Coles, 1981). Our argument therefore, is that most states in the world are 
multinational in composition. Europe, Asia, the Americas and Africa are classified examples of multinational 
states. Specific country examples are the United States, United Kingdom, Spain, France, India, Switzerland, 
Pakistan,  Sri-Lanka,  the  Old  Russian  state,  China,  Nigeria,  Liberia,  and  Ghana  etc.  The  traditional  socio-
economic, ethnic and political problems generated by being a multinational and multilingual state combine to 
serve as source of friction amongst peoples, when such variables are not taken cognizance of by the statecraft. 
The cumulative effect of the neglect of the socio-political differences amongst the people, by the managers 
of  the  state  enterprise,  is  conflict,  which  sometimes  lead  to  full  scale  wars  with  all  the  attendant 
consequences. This scenario reminds one of the 100 years’ war in Europe, the 1914 and 1939 great European 
wars (Akinyemi, 2001: 4). Africans had also fought wars among themselves. The great old empires like Ghana, 
Mali, Songhai, Bornu, Oyo, Benin, Ibadan etc, fought series of wars to establish themselves as prominent 
states both in the savannah and the forest regions (Stride and Ifeka, 1973; Fage, 1969). In Asia, shortly before 
Japan embarked on a career of continental expansion, there was the 1894 – 1895 Sino-Japanese war (Palmer 
and Perkins, 2005; 439). Other wars in Asia included the great Korean war of the 1950s, where the United 
Nations collective security potentials blossomed (Kegley and Wittkoft, 1993: 95), the Burmese war of 1824 – 
1826 and Indo-Chinese war of 1946 – 54 (Cole, 1981). According to William Zartman, such conflicts often 
involve  basic  values  of  territorial  integrity  and  political  independence  as  well  as  domestic  political 
consolidation and international rivalries of newly independent states. In all of this, the stakes are always very 
high and they are typical of the economic and political values that are features of nation building. In most 
cases, the conflicts involve external powers invited to lend support to the parties in the conflict or inserting 
themselves into the conflict because of their interest in the outcome or the parties involved in the crisis 
(Zartman, 1991: 2). In this regard, conflicts whether domestic, sub-regional, regional or interstate, present a 
real challenge for the maintenance of world order. 
The concept of conflict is highly diverse as it is controversial. However, in this study, we shall adopt a very 
simple notion of conflict which fortunately reflects the situation in Liberia, leading to the intervention of the 
Economic  Community  of  West  African  States  Monitoring  Group,  popularly  known  as  ECOMOG.  In  this 
connection, conflict is a simple contest of parties, each trying to impose a unilateral solution to a problem. 
The challenge to humanity here is to resolve and manage the crisis through multilateral solution to replace 
the attempt of each party to impose its will through a unilateral action (Zartman, 1991: 1). Although it is true 
that  cooperation  requires  compromise  over  ends  and  means,  it  is  equally  true  that  people  prefer  to International Journal of Development and Sustainability                                                                        Vol.2 No.2 (2013): 777-786 
 
 
 
ISDS  www.isdsnet.com                                                                                                                                                                               779 
accomplish their objectives by themselves as much as possible. Of course, the desire to act alone may sound 
out of place in an interdependent world; it is basic to the egotistical nature of rational actors. For instance, in 
Namibia, Vietnam, Algeria, the Falklands, the West Bank, Kuwait, Afghanistan, the Western Sahara, the Horn 
of Africa, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi, Nigeria etc; the parties in conflict at any point in time had 
always wanted to resolve the problem unilaterally, by holding on, and denying the claims of the challenging 
party. The opposing party equally insisted on unilateral solution to the crisis. But when two attempts at 
unilateral solution run up against each other, the end product is conflict. Thus if in the final analysis, one side 
does not prevail, as in the Liberian case, multilateral negotiation must come to the rescue. Therefore, conflict 
management and resolution becomes more attractive through multilateral means than through unilateral 
approach. 
Our position, thus, is that multilateral solution has a very high and useful utilitarian value in conflict 
management. In the approach less destruction of lives and property are guaranteed. As peace returns to the 
society, trade and commerce would go on smoothly. The approach allows for agreement and a common 
definition of the conflict is found to placate the parties to the conflict. In other words, the multi-lateralists 
must show the unilateralists that the solution would leave all parties to the conflict better off. Our analysis 
has shown that the multi-lateralist usually is a neutral third party basically on a diplomatic peace initiative 
and  a  representative  of  an  international  organisation.  But  the  international  organisation  itself  has  its 
operational guidelines in all its activities, including intervention. Multilateral diplomacy in conflict resolution 
involves intervention in various ways, ranging from preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and 
post-conflict peace-building. 
The terms identified above are fundamental to collective security. They are integrally related and are 
basically the ingredients that make intervention or multilateral conflict resolution a worthwhile experiment. 
Preventive diplomacy is an action to stop disputes arising between parties to prevent existing disputes from 
escalating into matured conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when it occurs. Peacemaking is an action 
to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as stated in Chapter 6 of the 
Charter of the UN (Sohn, 1995: 24-25). Peacekeeping on the other hand is the deployment of a UN presence 
in  the  field,  with  the  consent  of  the  parties  in  conflict,  and  it  involves  the  UN  or  other  international 
organisations’ military or police personnel and some civilians as the case may be. Peacekeeping is therefore, 
a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace. The 
success of these three areas of action would strengthen the opportunity for post conflict peace-building. It is 
the post-conflict peace-building action that would identify and support structures which would strengthen 
and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict (UN Secretary General, 1992: 1). 
As noted earlier, intervention in the internal affairs of other states can only be realized under the umbrella 
of an international organisation, which may be the UN or other regional organizations, with the approval of 
the  UN.  But  international  law,  which  is the  law  that  helps  to  organise  the  international  society,  forbids 
intervention in the internal affairs of other states. Specifically, Chapter one, Article 2(7) of the UN Charter 
forbids  intervention  in  the  ‘matters  which  are  essentially  within  the  domestic  jurisdiction  of  any  state 
…’(Sohn, 1995;15-16). However to resolve the seeming helplessness, the same UN Charter in  Chapter 7, 
Articles 41 and 42 as well as in Chapter 8, Article 52, allows for intervention with conditions, particularly International Journal of Development and Sustainability                                                                        Vol.2 No.2 (2013): 777-786 
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if the crisis in such a state may threaten international peace and security (Sohn, 1995: 25-28). Article 41 
allows  for  limited  social  and  economic  sanctions  on  the  parties  in  conflict.  Article  42  provides  for 
peacekeeping by multinational force through the combination of air, sea and land, if Article 41 fails to stem 
the conflict. Article 52 basically allows for intervention at the regional level, with the approval of the UN 
(Sohn, 1995: 27-28). Although, the UN Charter was a good umbrella for the West African leaders’ peace 
building project in Liberia, the World body, the OAS and the European Union (EU), were too busy with the 
World’s post ideological war situation that African conflicts were not important to them. In fact, it was only in 
1991,  after  the  ECOWAS  had  taken  the  initiative  that  the  President  of  the  UNSC  issued  a  statement 
commending the efforts of ECOWAS to promote peace in Liberia and calling upon the parties to the conflict to 
cooperate with ECOWAS (Shaw, 2003: 1157). 
It should be noted that the West African leaders were not unaware of the relevant articles, especially 
Article 52, of the UN Charter, which provides for regional initiative in the area of conflict management and 
resolution. Bearing this in mind and the colossal loss of lives and property in Liberia, West African leaders, 
under  the  leadership  of  Nigeria  did  not  waste  time  in  invoking  the  relevant  articles  of  the  UN  Charter, 
relating to conflict resolution and the relevant protocols of the International Humanitarian law, which deals 
with the protection of civilian population and civilian objects against the effects of hostilities (Bory, 1982: 18. 
UNSC, 1992 and 1993). The adoption of such relevant articles and protocols becomes necessary because 
ECOWAS, as a sub-regional organisation, has no defence clause in its treaty to undertake a peacekeeping 
mission. Although, a protocol relating to Mutual Assistance Defence (MAD) was in 1981, signed by member-
states of ECOWAS, as at 1990 when the Economic Community of West African  States Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG) troops, were to move into Liberia, the protocol had not been activated. But in addition to the UN 
Charter’s provisions on intervention, the West African Leaders in their wisdom and at the insistence of 
Nigeria, established in Banjul, The Gambia, in 1990 an ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (ESMC), to 
give legal backing to the peace plans in Liberia. It was the ESMC that created ECOMOG and authorized its 
intervention in Liberia on behalf of ECOWAS (Ate, 2001: 118; Eze, 1993: 12-17). Nigeria’s pivotal role may 
not be unconnected with the country’s concern for human disaster that large scale conflict may produce. 
Couple with this, is her long standing experience in peace-keeping operations in various parts of the globe, 
including Africa. The experience paid off as it was fully brought to bear in the ECOMOG operations in Liberia. 
At independence in 1960, Nigeria clearly spelt out the role she intended to play in the world affairs in the 
pursuit of peace and security within the framework of its obligations at the multilateral level. One of the 
Balewa’s  foreign  policy  thrusts,  which  of  course,  is  very  relevant  to  our  purpose  is  ‘promotion  of 
international peace and security as well as measures aimed at reducing world tensions’ (Oni, 2002: 8). 
The test of Nigeria’s commitment to world peace came within a few months after her independence. The 
country was feasibly represented in the Congo mission, under the United Nations, between 1960 and 1964. 
In  Congo,  Nigerian  military,  police  and  civilian  personnel  did  creditably  well.  Henceforth,  the  country 
participated  in  many  UN  sponsored  peace-keeping  missions  across  the  globe.  In  chronological  order, 
Nigeria’s presence had been felt in the following UN sponsored peace-keeping missions: 
  The Congo Mission, 1960 – 1964; ONUC (United Nations Operation in the Congo); 
  The Tangayika Mission, 1964; International Journal of Development and Sustainability                                                                        Vol.2 No.2 (2013): 777-786 
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  Indo-Pakistan Border Mission, 1965 – 1966 (UNIPOM – United Nations Indo-Pakistan Observer Mission); 
  Lebanon Mission, 1978 (UNIFIL – United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon); 
  OAU Peacekeeping Mission in Chad, 1981 – 1982;  
  Iran – Iraq Border Mission, 1988 – 1991, (UNIIMOG – UN Iran – Iraq Military Observer Group); 
  The Angolan Mission, 1989 (UNAVEM I, II and III – UN Angola Verification Mission); 
  The Namibia Mission, 1989 – 1990 (UNTAG – UN Transition Assistance Mission in Namibia); 
  The Somalia Mission, 1992 – 1995 (UNOSOM – UN Operation in Somalia); 
  The Yugoslavia Mission, 1992 – 1994 (UNIPROFOR – UN Interim Protection Force); 
  The Western Sahara Mission, 1991 – 1996, 
  UN Mission for the Referendum in Somalia (MINORSO); 
  The Iraq – Kuwait Mission, 1991 – 2002 (UNIKOM – UN Iraq – Kuwait Observer Mission); 
  The Rwanda Mission, 1993 – 1996, (UNAMIR – UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda) and 
  The Liberian Mission, 1993 – 1997 (UNOMIL – UN Observer Mission in Liberia) (Oni, 2002: 10-11). 
 
2. The Nigerian public and the Liberian enterprise 
Like most of the foreign policy initiatives taken by the IBB’s government between 1985 and 1993, the Liberia 
peace mission also received its own share of public criticism from the ever articulate Nigerian population. As 
we have highlighted in the previous chapters of this study, the fundamental arguments have always been that 
the government should allow “charity to begin at home and probably ends abroad”. This is because most 
critics of the Liberian mission believed that the huge sum of money expended on the peace mission could be 
better utilized at home to provide employment and other social amenities. The argument went further that 
considering the crushing and excruciating economic condition at home, the Liberian adventure was a costly 
one which Nigeria could not afford. However, the protagonist of the peace deal himself, Gen Babangida, early 
in the Liberian operation, offered some explanations. At a press briefing in Lagos, on October 31, 1990, he 
explained that: 
…  perhaps  many  do  not  yet  know,  nor  appreciate  either  the  danger  of  international 
embarrassment the Liberian crisis portends for all of us in this sub-region in particular, and to 
Africa  and  the  black  race  in  general  …Our  critics  tend  to  ignore  the  appalling  human 
catastrophe which the Liberian crisis has created for us in this Sub-region …. for the avoidance of 
doubt,  neither  Nigeria nor  the members  of  the  ECOMOG  forced  their  way  into  the  Liberian 
conflict  in  a  manner  ….  resembling  military  adventurism.  Nigeria  is  a  member  of  the  Sub-
regional group that took a solemn decision to restore peace by separating the warring factions 
in Liberia, which has been…, without any legitimately constituted authority. (Babangida, 1990) 
Gen. Babangida still in defence of Nigeria’s intervention in Liberia, rhetorically asked his critics: International Journal of Development and Sustainability                                                                        Vol.2 No.2 (2013): 777-786 
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… should Nigeria and other responsible countries in the sub-region stand by and watch the 
whole of Liberia turned into one massive graveyard? … the massacre of thousands of innocent 
civilians, including those of foreign nations, women and children, some of whom had sought 
protection in the churches, mosques, diplomatic missions, hospitals and under the United Nations 
and  Red  Cross  umbrella,  contrary  to  all  recognised  standard  of  civilian  behaviour  and 
international ethics and decorum. (Babangida,  1990;  Obasi,  1992:  335-337) (provided  the 
justification for intervention in the Liberian crisis) 
In the final analysis, just like the former Togolese President believed, Gen Babangida seemed to be saying 
that if you see a next-door neighbour’s house on fire, you must act speedily to help put it out, because you do 
not known when the resulting conflagration may spread to your home. In line with this position, Nigeria 
actually acted fast and today the UN has commended the country, for the relative peace in Liberia. 
 
3. Nigeria in Liberia: The constraints 
The success of Nigerian led intervention in Liberia was not without some difficulties. A discussion of such 
constraints is not meant to write-of the whole operation, rather, it is meant to serve as an eye opener for 
future operations, since we may never see the last of military interventions in peace-keeping process within 
the sub-region. Except human  beings ceased to interact, our position remains the most realistic way of 
looking at the competition for political power and sharing of scarce resources within the West African Sub-
region. 
Indeed, one of the major tasks of ECOMOG was to monitor a complete ceasefire and halt destruction of 
lives and property. But at the time ECOMOG forces landed at the Freeport of Liberia, a ceasefire had not been 
achieved and so there was no ceasefire to monitor. The erring factions were still at each other’s neck and in 
fact, Taylor’s NPFL welcomed the multinational forces into Liberia with ferocious attacks (Iweze, 1993: 219). 
This problem was compounded the more because of the absence of a Force Headquarters, (FHQ). The FHQ 
was not properly in existence at the time ECOMOG arrived in Liberia. The allied forces did not also have 
enough intelligence reports about the situation in Liberia. There were no military maps on Liberia which 
would  have  helped  in  no  small  way  in  the  gathering  of  intelligence  reports  (Iweze,  1993:  221).  These 
developments affected the morale and disposition of the troops towards the whole operation. In an ideal 
legal  military  intervention,  leading  to  peace-keeping  operations,  the  impartial  third  party  should  have 
secured a ceasefire before the allied forces would move into the troubled-region, to create a buffer-zone for 
effective ceasefire monitoring and safety of all mortals involved in the operations. What is more, the core of 
peacekeeping operations is the FHQ and therefore, should be the first to be set up so as to receive the troops 
and brief them on the situation on the ground. 
The initial high command of ECOMOG forces also had serious command problems and this manifested 
indiscipline among the rank and file of the forces. The conduct of the first Field Commander (FC) in person of 
Lt.  Gen.  Arnold  Quainoo,  within the  short  period  of  his  command  did not  help  matters.  Apart  from  his International Journal of Development and Sustainability                                                                        Vol.2 No.2 (2013): 777-786 
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inability to take firm decisions affecting the operations of the forces, he became negligent in his duties by 
allowing Prince Yomie Johnson of the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), a breakaway 
faction of the NPFL, an unrestricted access into the FHQ. This situation gave credibility problems to ECOMOG 
as an impartial arbiter. For one, NPFL and AFL as well as other interest groups accused ECOMOG of taking 
sides with INPFL, to the detriment of the others. Secondly, the situation finally paved the way for Prince 
Johnson to capture Doe, during the latter’s surprise visit to the FHQ (Iweze, 1993: 229). An impartial arbiter 
would have organized a rescued mission to either retrieve Doe, dead or alive. But this was not to happen as 
the FC himself ran for cover and for some time he shifted his office into the ECOMOG war– ship. This had a 
demoralising effect on the troops as the Sierra Leone and Ghanaian troops also left for the ship, leaving the 
Nigerian soldiers at the FHQ (Iweze, 1993: 230). The FC at some point even believed that ECOMOG had no 
business  being  in  Liberia  and  so  should  be  withdrawn.  It  was  in  the  midst  of  these  confusion  and 
uncertainties that a Nigerian officer, Gen. J.N. Dogonyaro, was posted to Liberia to replace the former F.C. It is 
instructive to note that inexperienced officers, particularly those who had never had experience of peace – 
keeping operations, should not be allowed to be at the top of the allied forces command. 
Part of the initial problem of the multinational intervention force was the anomaly in the appointment of a 
Deputy Force Commander (DFC), which had been conceded to Guinea and who should be an officer not 
below the rank of a Colonel or a Brigadier. However the only officer of the rank of a Brigadier in the Guinean 
army was the Head of state. The next senior officer was Lt. Col. Lamine Magasoumba. The promotion of 
Magasoumba to the rank of a Major General, on arrival in Sierra Leone undermined discipline and control, 
such that when the Guinean contingent became contagiously unruly, the DFC supported them instead of 
calling them to order in line with military tradition. The Guinean contingent was always complaining of being 
assigned to do difficult duties, a situation they interpreted to mean that it was a deliberate attempt by the 
Anglophones to eliminate the Francophones (Iweze, 1993: 226). An act of indiscipline also played out when 
the Sierra Leonean president, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, visited to bid the troops fare well. A Ghanaian battalion 
commander was rude to the ECOMOG chief of staff, who was a brigadier and a Nigerian, when the latter 
ordered the former to ‘bring the parade to attention and hand over to me’. The Ghanaian officer looked at the 
Nigerian superior officer and said he as a Ghanaian could not hand over to a Nigerian. Although the Nigerian 
ECOMOG chief of staff stood his ground, the Ghanaian officer only complied grudgingly (Iweze, 1993: 223). 
Situations like these dampened the morale of the troops as indiscipline was encouraged leading to some 
soldiers engaging in some unethical practices of stealing consumables, automobile tyres, abandoned cars and 
motor bikes while some equally engaged in abduction and rape of defenceless female individuals. It took 
quite a lot of efforts on the part of the new Commander, to stem such vices. 
Irregular supply of funds was another fundamental problem that faced the ECOMOG operations in Liberia. 
The initial dependence of the ECOWAS Secretariat on the good will of the troops contributing countries to 
take care of their contingents at least for some days, created some financial and related crisis. This problem 
became clear after each contingent had exhausted its initial supplies and the ECOWAS Secretariat could not 
immediately raise funds to support the forces. The ECOWAS Secretariat could not also provide enough drugs 
for the troops on schedule. The Ghanaian contingent which came with a field hospital, were busy taking care 
of their soldiers. The troops allowance which was put at $3per day was too meagre for soldiers, who were to International Journal of Development and Sustainability                                                                        Vol.2 No.2 (2013): 777-786 
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fight, get injured or killed (Iweze, 1993: 238). Even when the allowance was increased to $5 per day, the 
payment was not as regular as it should be. There were also inadequate supply of uniforms, boots and related 
needs of the troops. These shortcomings diminished the morale of the soldiers as a fighting force that should 
be taken good care of. Prince Yomie Johnson must have exploited the situation to donate uniforms and boots 
for ECOMOG soldiers in return for some arms like the ‘105 HOW’ weapons which he needed to blow up the 
state house, the Liberian Executive Mansion (Iweze, 1993: 231). It is important to note that in operations 
such as Peacekeeping, regular supply of funds was necessary to discourage the troops from looting and other 
vices. 
The forces also encountered problem of logistics which had to do with lack of effective communication, 
inadequate transport facilities and almost non – availability of officers trained in logistics support. In all these 
problems, one thing was very clear and that was the fact that Nigerian government remained steadfast in its 
mission. This has shown absolutely that Nigeria’s military establishment is a very important factor in the 
domestic and international political future of the great Sub-region of West Africa.                                            
The  sacrifices  of  Nigeria  and  other  West  African  countries  were  too  costly,  yet  their  success  was so 
brilliant that it should be used to the benefit of the sub-region. But this can only be achieved if the community 
bravely effects the necessary institutional changes taught by the glaring lessons of the conflict in Liberia. The 
community should jointly engage the international community in a partnership for trade, investment as well 
as financial and logistic support for conflict resolution, management, peace-keeping and regional security. 
The Liberian and other international crises had shown the potential of conflicts to undermine international 
human rights and individual freedoms and to exacerbate tensions that threaten world peace and stability. In 
this connection, international organisations, both regional and global, should collaborate for a new thinking 
on the sanctity of national sovereignty, such that the sovereignty of nations may no longer be held sacrosanct 
in the face of serious outrages and abuses of human rights, ethnic cleansing and genocide. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In the final analysis, some of the institutional changes that would promote new arrangements and structures 
for peace and stability in the West African sub-region should include: 
  Discouragement  of  war  of  proxy  and  direct  or  indirect  support  for  political  exiles,  dissidents  and 
insurgents; 
  West African states and governments should promote and sustain good governance; 
  Popular participation in democratic rule should be encouraged; 
  Electoral processes should be free, fair and transparent; 
  In case of conflicts, consultation, mediation and dialogue should be encouraged instead of strong-arm 
solutions; 
  Protagonists should be included in the peace process instead of being labelled as rebels; 
  Peacekeeping  forces  should  be  adequately  equipped  and  administered  for  effective  enforcement  of 
economic and diplomatic sanctions as well as embargoes on arms and ammunition; International Journal of Development and Sustainability                                                                        Vol.2 No.2 (2013): 777-786 
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  A military staff committee should be instituted within the Executive Secretariat of ECOWAS; 
  An office of a Special Representative should be established in the field to provide political direction to the 
FC; 
  FCs should be answerable to the Authority through the Executive Secretary and not to force contributing 
states; 
  Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes should be credibly backed by arms-
for-food and other incentive packages, and finally; 
  Since ECOWAS, with the Liberian experiment has been able to transform and expand its mandate from 
political and economic matters to that of managing, resolving and preventing conflicts, ECOMOG, should 
be kept as a model for the rest of Africa, as an intervention force to tackle instability in the continent. 
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